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Abstract
We use the result from a survey of Japanese ￿rms in manufac-
turing and services to investigate the choice of wage and employ-
ment adjustments when they needed to reduce substantially the
total labor cost. Our regression analysis indicates that the large
size reduction favors the layo⁄s of core employees, whereas base
wage cuts are more likely if ￿rms do not feel immediate pressures
from the external labor market or strong competition in the prod-
uct market. We also ￿nd some evidence that the concerns over
adverse selection or demoralizing e⁄ects of wage cuts are real.
Firms do try to avoid using base wage cuts if they consider these
factors more important.
1 Introduction
The decade-long stagnation of the economy left visible and perhaps also
invisible scars in many facets of the Japanese economy. During the
decade of stagnation (take,1992-2001, for example, as the decade), the
economy lost 3.5 million regular, full time jobs. Although the precise
breakdown is not readily available, the severity of the recession is shown
in the proportion of job losses due to outright layo⁄s, rather than those
by not replacing retiring employees. Figure 1 can be used to compare the
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 lost decade with past recessions. The share of layo⁄s was indeed large
during the period. Still it is comparable to the ￿gure in the recession
after the ￿rst oil shock.
Prior to the decade-long stagnation of the economy, a conventional
wisdom was that Japanese ￿rms exhaust all other means available be-
fore they ￿nally resort to shedding their permanent employees. They can
adjust overtime work hours, they reduce work shifts, reduce bonus pay-
ments, or cut o⁄ some temporary workers. Notable among these is the
extent of wage ￿ exibility due mainly to the importance and its ￿ exibility
of bonus payments and overtime wages. As a result of the availability
and ￿ exible use of these means, Japanese ￿rms rarely resorted to outright
layo⁄s of employees, especially those with regular, full-time status.
The lost decade changed the perception, if not the reality, of the
Japanese ￿rms￿adjustment under distress. The Japanese ￿rms no longer
appear committed to avoid using layo⁄s as a means of adjustments. If a
￿rm deems it necessary, layo⁄s of permanent employees are used, some-
times without exhausting other means of adjustments. There are also
indications suggesting that the dichotomy between the base wage and
bonus may no longer be applicable, at least for some segments of em-
ployees. Seniority-based wage systems have been altogether abolished
in many major ￿rms1. Even at ￿rms retaining some features related to
seniority, the impact of tenure on base wage has been reduced. Mincer
and Higuchi (1988) emphasized the intensive investment in ￿rm-speci￿c
human capital as the underlying cause for the steep wage-seniority pro-
￿le. Their analysis also highlighted rapid technological changes as the
major factor responsible for the heavy investment, and hence, the steeper
wage pro￿le. Consistent with their thesis, we have several indications
suggesting diminished investment in training at the work place, as well
as reduced commitments of the employees to continued employment.2
The lost decade was also a prolonged period of the de￿ ation. The
economy hovered around zero to some negative in￿ ation rate for nearly
a decade. Without the bu⁄er of mild in￿ ation, nominal rigidity in price
1Probably the best known earlier example is Fujitsu, one of the largest and oldest
electronics-computer ￿rm. in 1993, Fujitsu introduced a package of new personnel
management, pay, and evaluation system wherein they completely abolished seniority
wage and replaced by ￿ at annual salary which is adjusted according to performance
based evaluation. After series of stagnant company performance, internal ￿ghting
and mounting problems and con￿ icts, Fujitsu rescinded many of these features in
2001. Other well known examples include Mitsui Trading and Namco (arcade games
and entertainment).
2For example, using a panel data (Keio Household Panel Survey), Toda and
Higuchi and(2005) ￿nds the decline in the incidence of ￿rm level training in the
1990s, as well as the shifting emphasis more towards general, than ￿rm speci￿c con-
tents. Kato(2003) and Kambayashi and Kato(2008)
2or wage directly resulted in the real rigidity The other side of the de￿ a-
tion in the late 1990s was the important change in the product market
competition. The consumer spending dwindled while newer types of
retailers rapidly invaded the markets, with the help by lifting of the
crucial regulation on the entry of large scale retailers. The joint out-
come of deregulation and intensi￿ed retailer competition was the rapid
shifts away from traditional retailers, especially, mom-and-pap stores
and department stores. The price-cost ratio continued decline during
and beyond the lost decade. Even after the weak recovery from 2002
onward, the gross pro￿t margin of the retail sector remained at a level
well below early 1990s3. Deteriorations in the price-cost margins and the
weakening in the labor market induced the downward age adjustment in
the latter half of the lost decade; Kimura and Ueda (2001) and Kuroda
and Yamamoto (2005) agree that the nominal rigidity disappeared some-
time in the late 1990s 4. Although it is still not clear if the de￿ ationary
experience also changed the degree of real wage rigidity, the increased
uncertainty and the potential for future job loss might have had lessened
the worker￿ s resistance against the nominal wage cut5
These changes have brought about several rami￿cations on the macro-
economic ￿ uctuations of the Japanese economy. The most important
implication is on the slope of the Phillips curve. To the extent that
the wage ￿ exibility diminished, the impact of a negative shock on the
economy may be transmitted more directly to the quantity adjustments,
hence ￿ attening the slope of the Phillips curve.6
A ￿ attening of the Phillips curve (if it is real) is consistent with the
3The ratio of the operating pro￿t to the total assets of the retail sector average
at 4.5-5% in the late 1980￿ s to the early 1990s, then bottomed to 1.9% in 1998. As
of 2007, the ratio is still 2.7%.
4Actually, the nominal wage rigidity could have been a savior of the country if
the de￿ ation pressure did push the economy in the direction of the downward spiral.
5Ohtake (2007) uses a unique survey in which sample workers are asked the choice
between wage cut and the probability of layo⁄s. He reports that the choice shifts
toward the probability of layo⁄s as these two magnitudes are increased. When asked
about 5% wage cuts and 5% of layo⁄s, more than 85% preferred wage cut, whereas
comparing 30% wage cut with 30% layo⁄s, the share preferring wage cut is reduced
to 59%. If this is representative, worker can tolerate only small changes in wage, so
wage ￿ exibility may not be relied upon if the large scale cut in labor cost was deemed
necessary.
6Several studies try to trace the possible impact of the change in employment
and wage adjustments on the slope of the Phillips Curve. See also Yamamoto (2008)
for a review of recent studies on this subject. Ariga (2006) found that procyclical
￿ uctuations in mark-up had been partially responsible for a relatively steep Phillips
Curve up until early 1990s, but, the reduced magnitude of the mark-up ￿ uctuations
might have contributed to the ￿ attening of the Phillips curve.
3popular view that the Japanese employment system (and its adjustment
mechanism) is long gone. Nevertheless, we have no shortage of empiri-
cal studies supportive of the constancy, rather than any major changes.
Even a cursory look at some of the numbers indicates that we should not
take for granted that Japanese ￿rms adjust wages and employment in a
manner fundamentally di⁄erent from the one operative say, in 1980s or
earlier. Even as of now, the impact of tenure on earnings is the largest
among major OECD countries, and the impact remains statistically sig-
ni￿cant. After incorporating the severity of the recession in the last 15
years, no conventional econometric analysis can make a strong case that
the core of the Japanese labor market has become more ￿ uid, either in
terms of turnover rates, changes in transition probabilities in and out
of employment, or in terms of adjustment speed of employment towards
the target or long-run equilibrium.7
Given the multitudes of changes during the last 15 years or so after
the bursting of the bubble, it seems important to re-visit the question
on wage and employment ￿ exibility. In this paper we try to shed new
light on this important issue of employment and wage adjustments at
individual ￿rm levels. We do so by using a large scale survey of Japanese
￿rms. The key set of questions in the survey ask if the sample ￿rms had
an experience in which they needed to reduce substantially the labor
cost. To those who said yes, we asked what qualitative and quantitative
adjustments they actually made. We use the survey to recover the major
factors responsible for both employment and wage adjustments, together
with other covariates which might have generated important impacts
on these decisions. Included among those are set of proxy variables
representing the nature of the competition and their market power in
the product market.
Our focus in these adjustments are the base wage cuts and layo⁄s of
the core employees, i.e., regular and full-time workers. There is not much
doubt that even in the past, Japanese ￿rms readily adjusted the size of
non-core employees and bonus payments to respond to short term ￿ uc-
tuations in ￿rm performance. By focusing directly on the adjustments
of the base wage and the size of core employees, the subsequent analysis
highlight the di⁄erence in wage and employment adjustment in Japan
after the lost decade. Based on regression analysis, we make the fol-
lowing points: (1) some of the proxy variables representing the e⁄ect of
the base wage cut tend to reduce respective adjustment size or proba-
bilities; however, (2) in some other responses, notably in employment
adjustments, we also ￿nd puzzling results; (3) ￿rms facing competitive
7See a comprehensive review of the recent literature in Ohta, Genda, and
Teruyama (2007)
4pressure in the labor market tend to rely more on employment adjust-
ment than wage adjustments; and (4) if the size of adjustment is large,
the burden is more on employment than in the base wage adjustment.
These ￿ndings broadly support our thesis that the base wage ￿ exibility
is not an indication of the labor market competitiveness; instead, it is a
proxy for the wage premium or rents which enable them to ￿ exibly ad-
just the base wage downward under distress. On the other hand, ￿rms
facing immediate competition in the labor market have little room to
adjust wages without damaging the cooperation or coordination with
their employees, hence resort to the employment adjustments.
The sequel of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we o⁄er a selected survey of the past empirical studies on employment
and wage adjustments in Japan. Section 3 introduces our survey and
provides summary statistics to o⁄er a bird￿ s eye view of the data. Section
4 reports our regression results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Employment and wage adjustments in Japanese
￿rms
Up until the beginning of the lost decade, the sizable body of empirical
literature on employment and wage adjustments were nearly unanimous
in portraying Japanese ￿rms with more ￿ exible wages but relatively rigid
employment, especially in shedding the core employees, in comparison
with ￿rms in other major developed countries.8 For several reasons, it is
unclear if such a stylized view still applies to the Japanese labor market
today9.
Several recent studies focused upon nominal downward wage rigid-
ity during the lost decade. Using macro time series data, Kimura and
Ueda (2001) ￿nd signi￿cant nominal downward rigidity up until 1996,
whereas the rigidity disappeared after the onset of the second wave of
downturn from 1997 onward. They also ￿nd supporting evidence that ￿
wages do converge to their equilibrium levels with the passage of time￿ ,
a conclusion shared by Kuroda and Yamamoto (2004).10 The charac-
8Although all the studies are virtually unanimous in con￿rming nominal wage
￿ exibility prior to the lost decade, there are some indications that Japanese wages
exhibit some degree of rigidity against real shocks. See for example, Branson and
Rotemberg (1980).
9See, as a representative collection of recent studies, Chuma (2002), Kato (2001)
and Kato and Kambayashi (2008). Tachibanaki (1987) reviews the typical studies
on relative wage ￿ exibility in Japan before the bubble period. There exist some
important dissidents on both wage ￿ exibility and employment rigidities. Notable
among them is an early study by Ohtake (1988) on wage adjustment in which he
￿nds nominal wage ￿ exibility but not in real wage.
10They conclude that their analysis indicates that the nominal rigidity led to an
5terization of the nominal wage rigidity in the lost decade is consistent
with the changes in real wage during the period: the real wage and la-
bor share in national income continued their upward trend in the early
1990s, but peaked out in the mid 1990s, when the nominal wage started
to erode. Unfortunately, these studies do not cover the period prior to
the lost decade so it is not clear if the results are in direct con￿ ict with
the earlier studies. At the least, it seems possible that the Japanese
wage ￿ exibility prior to the lost decade was due partly to the sizable
core in￿ ation, which lasted up until the latter half of the 1980s.
Additional factors account for apparently contradictory pieces of ev-
idence found for the wage rigidity. For one thing, most of the studies
on wage adjustments up to the early 1990￿ s used either macro time se-
ries data or publicly available cross section data on wages. It is only in
the last 15 years or so that we started to use microscopic data in Japan.
Since most of the data used in the recent studies do not cover years prior
to 1990, it is not at all clear if shifting conclusions are due to the use of
microscopic data, or to the di⁄erent time coverage. If anything, earlier
studies using data prior to the 1990s tend to be more favorable for wage
￿ exibility, especially those using macro time series data. Even so, the
￿ exibility refers mainly to the bonus or total wage compensation, and
less to the base wage. During the lost decade, bonus and over time wage
payments declined far more than the base wage.11 For these reasons, it
is not clear if the wage - especially the base wage- ￿ exibility applies to
the most recent years after sizable declines in the ￿ exible components of
the total wage.
Another misgiving of the past empirical studies on wage adjustments
is that these studies are largely silent as to exactly what the "equilib-
rium" or long run wage rate is, and how it is determined. In a typical
macroeconomic study, wage adjustment is presumed in response to a
macroeconomic imbalance between labor demand and supply, without
explicit modeling of the labor market equilibrium. "Adjustment cost"
is transplanted to a conventional model of supply and demand in the
labor market without much justi￿cation or checking if the amalgamated
￿ adjustment model￿is really internally consistent.
Compared to wage adjustment studies, those focusing on the em-
ployment side tend to reach broadly similar conclusions, irrespective of
the data type or the time period12. Speci￿cally, they ￿nd that the ad-
increase in unemployment of approximately 1 percentage point at the most until
1997.
11According to the basic wage survey, base wage increased by 4.5% from 1995 to
2005, whereas the bonus payment decreased by 16.5% for the same period.
12Muramatsu(1995) o⁄ers the survey of representative studies that used data prior
6justment speed of employment at Japanese ￿rms is substantially smaller
(slower) than those found in comparable studies on the United States.
Second, the slow adjustment is a particularly robust ￿nding for the core
employees, full time, regular workers.
The apparent rigidity may well be due to the fact that, up until
1990￿ s, the economy experienced healthy growth with relatively short
and shallow recessions. They simply did not feel compelled to cut o⁄
some of its permanent sta⁄. This view is certainly consistent with ￿nd-
ings from some recent studies using panel data of individual ￿rms show-
ing that ￿rms do resort to layo⁄s of core employees if they sustain size-
able and persistent (operating) pro￿t loss. Studies by Suruga (1997) and
others use panel data of (large) ￿rms and ￿nd that not only consecutive
pro￿t losses signi￿cantly predict sizeable downward adjustment of the
employees, ￿nancial di¢ culties of ￿rms accentuate and accelerate these
adjustments [Ogawa (2003)]. Related to this is a well known study of
Zombie ￿rms by Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap (2008), wherein "ever-
greening" by main banks gives rise to forbearance and continued lending
to ￿rms that are practically bankrupt. Studies by Fukao, Miyagawa and
others demonstrate that during the lost decade many low productivity
￿rms were allowed to survive, retarding signi￿cantly the productivity
growth.13
Ohta, Genda and Kondo (2007) focuses on the generational inequal-
ity caused by the sluggish employment adjustments. They ￿nd that ￿rms
employing large shares of older workers are far less likely to post vacan-
cies. In other words, the age composition of employees seems to have
an important impact on adjustment speed. It is also well known that
employment adjustments tend to be faster in services than in manufac-
turing, whereas there is no robust correlation between the adjustment
speed and ￿rm size [Muramatsu (1995), Suruga (1997)]. In sum, these
studies indicate that the size and the age composition of employees, as
well as technological factors all play signi￿cant, if not decisive roles in
the magnitude and speed of employment adjustments.
One study somewhat similar to our own is the paper by Tachibanaki
and Morikawa (2002), in which they use census of manufacturers micro
data and estimate ￿rst whether or not sample plants survive into the
to the lost decade.
13The studies of the lost decade [ e.g., Fukao et al (2008)] found that the slow and
hard earned recovery from the long recession was made possible through costly and
sizable reductions of permanent sta⁄, together with other measures to streamline
organization, accommodate advances in IT technology, etc. In other words, produc-
tivity recovery was largely an outcome of restructuring. Therefore, teh overall picture
is that ￿rms reducing size tend to have higher productivity than those retaining or
expanding employment.
7next period, and then estimate wage and employment adjustments as
the second stage.
[note "the second stage" refers to the second regression in the pro-
cedure called two stage regressions. Since the second stage does not
indicate temporal sequence (they are estimated simulataneously), I re-
tain the current expression].
Using the two stage estimation, they ￿nd a statistically signi￿cant
negative impact of wage adjustment on employment adjustment equa-
tion, thus arguing that the two adjustments are substitutes.
Except for the study by Tachibanaki and Morikawa, virtually all
the past empirical studies we found focus only on wage or employment
adjustments, which might lead to serious bias, or at least ine¢ cient
estimates of the adjustment mechanism. As a matter of general principle,
it goes without saying that employment and wage adjustments should be
treated as an integral part of the ￿rms￿overall adjustments to changing
product demand, or other factors facing them. For example, consider
a ￿rm employing labor from a highly competitive labor market. Such
a ￿rm does not have power to adjust the wage. They can only adjust
employment. On the other hand, ￿rms earning extra pro￿ts due to the
market power in the product market may well be sharing part of the
pro￿ts in terms of a wage premium. If so, these ￿rms might have more
room to adjust wage downwards, along with a decline in pro￿t, without
generating a serious adversely reaction from the labor.
After reviewing the past studies, we ￿nd three issues are of particular
importance. First of all, it is important to have a framework of analy-
sis in which joint decisions on employment and wage adjustments are
analyzed. Secondly, in view of the multitude of changes the Japanese
corporate sector experienced, it is important also to use individual ￿rm
data by which we can identify and measure key characteristics in the
labor and product markets. Finally, given the severity and the length of
the general stagnation, care must be taken to account for the possible
impacts of the size of the necessary adjustments on the choice between
wage and employment.
3 The Survey
In September 2008, we conducted a survey on employment and wage
adjustments. The survey asks 31 questions in total, and they are di-
vided into three sections. In the ￿rst section, we ask the sample ￿rms
if in the past (since 1990) they needed to substantially reduce the to-
tal labor cost. For those who answered yes to the question, we ask the
nature of the problem they faced, employment and wage adjustments
they planned, and adjustments actually taken, as well as a variety of
8questions pertaining to both explicit and implicit costs associated with
employment and wage reductions. Some of those questions are based on
their experience and others are on hypothetical situations. In section
2, we collect questions on competition in the product market. The last
section covers questions on key indicators for broad characteristics of the
sample ￿rms.
We obtained 2645 responses from 22,757 mailed questionnaires, thus
the response rate is 11.6%.14 The mailing list is based upon the list of
￿rms that covers 26,574 ￿rms compiled by Research Institute of Econ-
omy, Trade, and Industry. We chose manufacturing and services as our
target industries. Table 1 o⁄ers summary statistics for the entire sample
of ￿rms. The crucial ￿rst question we asked was if in the past (since 1990)
they needed to substantially reduce the total labor cost. 763 ￿rms, com-
prising roughly 30% of the total sample, said yes. Table 1 shows that
general characteristics of the sample ￿rms do not di⁄er markedly de-
pending upon the answer to this question. The data indicates, however,
that ￿rms who said yes to the this question are, on average, more in
manufacturing, slightly younger, with somewhat large shares of workers
with long tenure (more than 15 years), slightly smaller both in terms of
employment and sales, and wage cost per capita is slightly smaller. The
di⁄erences in these averages are an order of magnitude smaller than the
corresponding standard deviations. Thus it is safe to say that there are
no immediate di⁄erences between the two sub samples.
Table 2 shows a chronological distribution of the episodes of the cost
reduction as perceived necessary by the sample ￿rms. As we expected,
most of the reported episodes occurred in the latter half of the lost decade
or later, especially in the ￿rst three years of this century, which com-
prises roughly one third of the total incidents. The unemployment rate
of the economy peaked at 5.4% in 2002 and only in three-year period,
the unemployment rate remained above 5%. Thus the concentration of
the distress during these three years are in accordance with the cyclical
changes in the labor market. As shown in Table 3, 75% of the incidences
are due to the decline of sales, with ￿ other reasons￿(not speci￿ed) ac-
counting for 18%. Table 4 shows the actual adjustments taken. Our
key questions were (1) did the ￿rm cut the base wage, and if so by how
much, and (2) did the ￿rm permanently laid o⁄ some of the regular,
full time employees, and if so, how many. Henceforth, until noted oth-
erwise, wage adjustments refer to the base wage cut, and employment
adjustment refers to the layo⁄of regular, full-time employees. Somewhat
surprisingly, about a quarter of the sample did not make base wage or
employment adjustments in spite of the apparent need for an adjust-
14The ￿nal number of valid responses we used was 2574.
9ment.15 Roughly 30% of ￿rms adjusted both employment and wage, and
about an equal number of ￿rms adjusted employment only. Slightly less
than 20% of ￿rms adjusted wages only, the smallest share among four
cells in Table 4.
The mean of the wage cost reduction is 12.9% of the total labor cost,
which is somewhat smaller than the 14.3% reduction originally planned.
When asked to decompose the reductions to wage and employment ad-
justments, the actual reduction of the employment was 15.7% on average,
and the average size of the base wage cut was 8.7%. About 17% of ￿rms
reduced the employment size more than they planned, whereas less than
5% of wage adjustment was more than the original plan.
Table 5 shows the changes in a few key variables during the three
year period surrounding respective episodes. Except for the recruit of
new school graduates, Table 5 shows that the ￿rms were on average still
struggling in the year after the distress episode. Even as of 2008, average
￿gures indicate that they have not fully recovered from those in the year
immediately before the incident. This is consistent with the view that
cost reduction was inevitable, given the severity and permanent nature
of the shock.
The survey asked to assess qualitatively the relevance of potential
factors preventing base wage cuts or the dismissals of full time, regular
employees.
Tables 6 and 7 summarize the responses to these questions. Our
survey agrees with many similar surveys done on wage rigidity in terms
of the respondents￿view of the relevance. The respondents think the
negative impact on worker morale as the most important factor prevent-
ing the base wage cut.16 The fear that the ￿rm may loose the most
productive employees is the distant second, followed by the concern over
the relative wage. The hypothesis that a wage cut is against the im-
plicit contract is the least popular, again echoing the results of the past
surveys, including our own in Kambayashi and Ariga (2008).
The second column shows the average score among the sample ￿rms
15We also asked if the ￿rm reduced wage cost by replacing regular full-time em-
ployees by either temporary or part-time workers, or by outsourcing. Only 23% of
the ￿rms experiencing the distress employed such means. The share of ￿rms using
these means is largest (33%) for the ￿rms that did not use either base wage cuts
or layo⁄s of core employees. On the other hand, even among the ￿rms that used
both means, roughly the same percentage (26%) of the ￿rms also employed these
additional means.
16This is the most popular answer in our previous survey (Kambayashi and Airga,
2008), in 12 country surveys jointly conducted by member countries of ECB Wage
Dynamics Network (2008), and also the one endorsed in Bewley￿ s book (1999). See
Berttola et al (2008) and Druant et al (2008) for the WDN survey results.
10who answered ￿ yes￿to the ￿rst question on the past distress. The last
column is the subset of the second sample who actually reduced the
base wage during the episodes. Across all questions except for the least
popular implicit contract hypothesis, the ￿rms with the distress expe-
riences consider each of these factors more important than the average
sample. For four of the seven questions listed in Table 6, Pearson￿ s Chi2
tests indicate signi￿cant di⁄erence in the response between the entire
sample and the sub-sample with distress experiences. We ￿nd the exact
analogue in Table 7 wherein we show the scores on seven questions in
which we asked the relevance of factors preventing dismissals of regular,
full-time employees. Namely, except for the last question, the second
column average is always higher than the ￿rst column. In ￿ve ques-
tions, Pearson￿ s Chi2 indicates signi￿cant di⁄erence at least with 5%
con￿dence level. On the other hand, ￿gures in the last column provide
us with somewhat puzzling results. In many questions in Tables 6 and
7, those who did reduce base wage (laid o⁄ permanent employees) on
average ￿nd those factors even more important in comparison with the
entire sample of distress ￿rms. On the other hand, the di⁄erences be-
tween the second and the third is smaller, and the same Pearson￿ s Chi2
test shows only two questions in Table 7 indicate signi￿cant di⁄erences
between the two groups. In Table 6, none of the comparison between
the second and third groups shows a statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence.
The responses to other questions related to wage and employment ad-
justment costs are more consistent with the adjustments they actually
took. For example, when asked about the likely impact on recruiting by
10% wage cut, those who did adjust the base wage downward consider
the potential impact less severe than those who did not. One unex-
pected result is found in the expected time (in days) required for the
overall e¢ ciency of the organization to fully recover to normal after a
10% reduction in sta⁄. The response shows on average that ￿rms who
adjusted wage only assess the length to be signi￿cantly shorter than the
others, while those who adjusted employment, but not wages, expect it
to take a longer time on average.
Among those who adjusted both wages and employment, when asked
about the sequential order of adjustments, 21% said wages ￿rst, whereas
27% said employment ￿rst, and, the remaining 51% more or less simul-
taneously.17
17Kuroda and Yamomoto (2005) ￿nds that labor cost adjustments were generally
carried out in the following order: overtime pay, bonuses, employment adjustments
including restriction of hiring younger employees and promotion of early retirement
programs, and ￿nally elimination of annual wage increases and reductions to regular
salaries.
11Finally, we tabulate characteristics of the product market competi-
tions in Table 8. Somewhat surprisingly, we ￿nd a consistent tendency
in the deviations of mean responses between those with and without the
episodes of distress. Compared to the sample average, ￿rms that experi-
ence distress are less likely to adopt mark-up pricing, more likely to face
price competition than competition in quality; and ￿nd the price com-
petition ￿erce, more likely to follow a 10% price cut by a rival ￿rm, and
have a shorter average frequency of price change. All of these character-
istics indicate that the distressed ￿rms face more competitive markets
than the sample average. Pearson￿ s Chi2 test indicates the di⁄erence is
signi￿cant in all but one question. The last two columns show the corre-
sponding averages for ￿rms who did reduce the base wage and laid o⁄the
core employees during the reported incidents. In comparison with the
second column, evidence is mixed. Among the base wage cut group, they
change prices more frequently, but less likely to respond to a 10% price
cut by a rival ￿rm. Similarly, the di⁄erence between the second and
the last columns are small and no clear pattern emerges whereas com-
parisons with the wage cut group show that the layo⁄ group is closer
to the incident group, or at least lies in between the incident and wage
cut group, possibly an indication that ￿rms are likely to use employ-
ment adjustment if they face less severe competition. In either case, the
di⁄erences are relatively small, compared to the di⁄erence between the
￿rst and the second group.
These simple tabulations are at least suggestive of possible links be-
tween the need and actual reduction of labor costs and the competition
the sample ￿rms face in the labor and the product markets. It is clear
that ￿rms tend to be more vulnerable to external shocks if they face a
highly competitive product market. The joint outcomes of the competi-
tion in the product and labor markets may have a systematic in￿ uence
on the measures taken to reduce labor cost, which simple tabulations
cannot reveal. If ￿rms command a large pro￿t margin with highly se-
cured market share, they may be able to absorb negative productivity
shocks without resorting to a major cost reductions, thus ￿rms are less
vulnerable to the shock. Costs or deadweight loss associated with infor-
mation imperfection and agency costs may also play important roles in
shaping the actual adjustments taken. We take up these issues more
systematically in the next section.
124 Econometric Analysis
4.1 Model speci￿cations
In order to explain the magnitude and the direction of adjustments taken
by the sample ￿rms in distress, we use the following sets of the explana-
tory variables. First we employ variables that represent the magnitude
of the shock that gave rise to the need for a labor cost reduction: the size
of the ￿ planned amount of cost reduction￿( in % of the total labor cost).
It is possible that this variable can be endogenous. For example, con-
sider a negative demand shock. The amount of reduction in production
depends on the size of the price adjustment (unfortunately we do not
observe this). Ceteris paribus, ￿rms adjusting more in price have smaller
adjustments in quantity, thus smaller ￿ planned amount￿ , and vice versa.
We take up this endogeneity issue later on. We also use the % change in
the year of the distress from the previous year for the following variables
as additional proxies for the impact of the shock: total sales (output),
bonus per employee, the number of new hires of school graduates, and
overtime work hours. For the full list of variables used in the regressions
below, see Appendix.
In the second set of variables, we consider two potential costs of
downward base wage adjustments as seen by individual ￿rms. First
of all, we can consider administrative and bargaining costs associated
with adjusting the base wage, which typically requires formal agreement
between the ￿rm and the representative of the employee. Sometimes
such an agreement can be ironed out only after lengthy negotiations
between both parties. This type of adjustment is potentially important
if the ￿rm needs to reduce its number of core employees. We also
use the scores in the qualitative assessments of the relevance of factors
preventing base wage cuts.
A signi￿cant change in the employment level may also require reshuf-
￿ ing its employees across establishments and/or functional units. The
￿rm may experience lower productivity until the reshu› ed employees
can adjust to new organization tasks, etc. These can be construed
broadly as those under the rubric of adjustment costs. We also use the
scores in the qualitative assessments of the relevance of factors prevent-
ing the dismissals of regular, full-time employees. These comprise the
third set of variables representing the cost of employment adjustment.
The fourth set of variables are proxies to represent the nature and
strength of product market competition. Finally, in the ￿fth set, we
include variables to represent the nature and the strength of the la-
bor market competition. We proxy the pressure from the competition
by the following variables. (1) Separation rate, the share of employees
13with 15 years or more tenure. We would expect that separation rate to
be negatively related to the overall satisfaction of the employees, thus
this negatively represents the strength of the labor market competition.
The share of employees with long tenure also negatively proxy the com-
petition. (2) The share of employees age 23 or younger. This share
represents recent growth as well as overall success of the ￿rms￿hiring.
We expect this should negatively proxy the strength of the labor market
competition.
Denote by ￿wD the amount of base wage reduction (in %) as re-
ported in the survey. Since only a subset of the ￿rms under distress















i is the actual adjustment size in the base wage, Xk
i is the set
of explanatory variables explained above, si is the planned adjustment
size of the total labor cost, and ui is the error term. (W) can be















is the equation for the actual amount (in %) of the reduction in regular
full-time employees. Again, only a subset of ￿rms reduced the employ-
ment. Hence we can estimate for the probability of employment adjust-
ment, or the size. Given the potential correlations of the error terms
in the two equations, the system can be estimated as bivariate probit.
Since we also observe the magnitude of adjustments, the system can be
estimated also by tobit.
4.2 Estimation results
4.2.1 Major ￿ndings
Our major results are shown in two tables. The ￿rst four columns [
(1)-(4)] in Table 9 report the probit and tobit regressions for the proba-
bility of wage and employment adjustments. We also include additional
estimations. The last two columns in Table 9 reports bivariate probit
speci￿cations. Table 10 reports instrumental probit and tobit results in
which we instrumented the planned_amount_of_cost_reduction vari-
able to correct for possible endogeneity.
14Let us begin with a group of variables representing the impact of
shocks. As expected, the adjustments are more likely and the estimated
size is larger when the planned cost reduction is larger. The estimated
coe¢ cient is highly signi￿cant in employment equations, but only mar-
ginally so in the wage adjustment.18 The estimated impacts of the shock
variables suggest that the employment adjustment size is larger than the
wage adjustment and also the ratio increases at a larger shock, indicat-
ing the obvious that there exists fairly narrow margins of the adjustment
in the base wage19. Decline in sales in the distress year20 also exerts
downward adjustments in both wage and employment. The coe¢ cients
are often signi￿cant. The other three proxies, reductions in bonus pay-
ments, hiring of new school graduates, and overtime hours, are typically
insigni￿cant.
The second group of variables [CW] represent the costs of base wage
adjustments and are mostly negative and some of them are signi￿cant or
nearly so: the number of meeting with worker representatives needed to
negotiate 10% wage cut [cost_of_base_wage_reduction1], and the ex-
pected increase in quits after a 10%cut of the base wage [cost_of_base_wage_reduction2].
The use of quits are standard in economics to distingusih it from
involuntary tunrovers (e.g., layo⁄s)
Another statistically signi￿cant impact in the wage cut regression is
found for the score on the relevance of the impact of adverse selection;
i.e., those who fear that they lose their most productive employees are
less likely to cut the base wage. All in all, these variables proxying the
cost of wage adjustments broadly support the prior that they should
reduce the size (probability) of the wage cut.
On the other hand, we cannot ￿nd any supporting evidence in the
variables representing the cost of downward employment adjustment
(variables in CL group). Especially surprising is the positive and sig-
18In a tobit regression (not reported), we ￿nd the share of wage adjustment
(wage adjustment divided by the sum of the two adjustments) is decreasing in the
planned_amount of_ cost_reduction.
19Using the tobit regressions in (3) and (4) of Table 9, the estimated adjust-
ment size of the base wage peaks at 8.5% when planned_amount_of_cost_reduction
is 19%, whereas the employment adjustment is monotonically increasing in the
same variable, and roughly the same magnitude of the wage adjustment up to
planned_amount_of_cost_reduction is about 10(%). The predicted e⁄ect on em-
ployment adjustment is about 15% at 22%, respectively, and roughly 20% when the
planned reduction is about 30%.
20Each of these "change" variables measures the % change in the year of the adjust-
ment from the previous year. For example, if sales_change is -10(%), this corresponds
to a 10% decline in the sales in the year that adjustments were made in compari-
son with the previous year. Thus we would expect the estimated coe¢ cient to be
negative.
15ni￿cant impact of the time needed to recover full productivity after the
10% reduction in employment [cost_of_employment_reduction2].
The third group of variables represents the product market character-
istics. The price elasticity of the product demand21 [demand curve] ex-
erts a signi￿cant negative impact on employment adjustments, whereas
its impact on wage reduction is typically insigni￿cant. Although mostly
not signi￿cant, the coe¢ cient of the degree of price competition (in-
versely ordered) is negative on employment but typically positive on
wage adjustment. The wage cut is less likely if price competition is
￿erce. The top two dummy variables measure the impact of price forma-
tion method (relative to the mark-up). In comparison with ￿rms whose
product prices are determined by the customer or the parent ￿rm, ￿rms
using markup pricing are more likely to adjust wages. Firms reluctant
to cut their own prices against a 10% price cut by a rival ￿rm are sig-
ni￿cantly less likely to cut wages. This result is not easy to interpret,
though. For one thing, concerted price changes may be a symptom of
market concentrations and oligopoly. If the ￿rm is a major player in the
market, however, the reluctance to match the price cut by a rival ￿rm
can be a signal of the dominance of the ￿rm in the market. Overall,
we have more evidence that wage cuts are more likely if the ￿rm has
some market power in the product market. In employment adjustment
regressions, the degree of price competition variable is consistently neg-
ative and in one case marginally signi￿cant. Aside from price elasticity
and this variable, no other variables appear to be important. In sum,
evidence is somewhat mixed in this group of variables. At the least,
we ￿nd no strong evidence that the wage cut is positively in￿ uenced
by product-market price competition. On the contrary, we have some
evidence indicating the employment adjustments are more likely if the
product market is more competitive.
Another fairly strong piece of evidence in support of the observation
above is the impact of the m variable that represents the share of labor
cost in total sales (adjusted for respective industry means). This can
be interpreted as representing the inverse of the productivity, or loosely
speaking, the size of the slack between the value added and the labor
cost. The higher the productivity relative to the wage cost, there exists
more room for wage reduction. To the extent that we expect product
market competition to reduce this margin, the ratio of the wage to the
value added should be closer to unity, leaving smaller room for wage ad-
justments. The impact on wage adjustments by this variable are always
21The price elasticity of the product demand is computed from the answer to the
following question."Upon a 10% increase in the price of your main product, how
much do you anticipate the decline (in %) in sales?"
16negative and in two regressions signi￿cant. The impact on employment
adjustment is negative, but none of them are statistically signi￿cant.
The last group of variables represents the strength of competition
faced in the labor market [L]. The coe¢ cients in wage regressions all in-
dicate the competitive pressure in the labor market actually reduces the
wage adjustment size and probability. Firms enjoying a low separation
rate are more likely to reduce the base wage than using layo⁄s. Wage
cuts are more likely at ￿rms with the higher share of employees with
15 years or more tenure. Firms with larger shares of senior employees
are also more likely to cut base wages. Unfortunately, none of these
estimated coe¢ cients in this group are signi￿cant in wage regressions.
The impact of separation rate on employment adjustment is positive and
often signi￿cant. The impact of other labor market variables on employ-
ment regressions are mostly insigni￿cant and tend to be unstable. Taken
together, these impacts of the labor market suggest strongly that ￿rms
facing immediate competitive pressure from the labor market are more
likely to use employment, not base wage adjustment.
To sum up, regression results shown in Tables 8 support the following
broad characterizations. First of all, we ￿nd evidence showing that ￿rms
are more likely to use the base wage cut when they do not fear immediate
repercussions either by increased quits, di¢ culty in hiring, demoralizing
workers, etc. The evidence suggests that it is not the competitiveness
in the labor market that induces the base wage cut. On the contrary,
the major factor inducing the wage cut is the ability and room of adjust-
ment in the base wage without jeopardizing the harmony, loyalty of the
employees and reputation as a good employer in the labor market. Only
￿rms not facing strong competition vis-a-vis the external labor market
can a⁄ord to cut the base wage. The evidence we found for the impacts
of product market characteristics also lends support to this thesis. On
the other hand, the size of the shock has the dominant impact on the
employment adjustment, which we do not ￿nd in wage adjustment.22
Among the proxy variables representing labor and product markets, the
only robust and signi￿cant impact on employment adjustment is per-
ceived price elasticity of product demand. Firms facing lower elasticity
are signi￿cantly more likely to use employment adjustment.
22Suruga (1997) and other similar analyses report that the consecutive losses in
operating income signi￿cantly predicts layo⁄s of the core employees. Unfortunately,
they do not investigate the wage adjustments in those ￿rms.
174.2.2 Robustness checks
We brie￿ y review additional sets of regression results23. First, (5a) and
(5b) in Table 9 shows the estimation results of a bivariate probit model.
The estimation results are qualitatively similar to the main results in
Table 9. Moreover, the reported covariance term is small and statistically
insigni￿cant. On a priori grounds the presumption should be that the
error terms in the two regressions should be highly correlated, but it is
not the case. We have no clear cut explanations why that is so. Most
likely, the result re￿ ects the fact that we have employed a large set of
dummy variables representing industry classi￿cation, employment size,
as well as a rich set of variables representing the magnitude of the shock
responsible for the reported distress. They are probably enough to soak
up the correlations in the residuals.
The ￿nal set of regressions in Table 10 use instruments for the cru-
cial variable, the size of the planned cost reduction. The regressions￿
overall ￿ts deteriorate signi￿cantly, even when we allow a large number
of instrumental variables. The bottom line is that the available set of
variables do not predict well the size of the shock. The other side of the
poor ￿t is that the shock variable is safely treated as being exogenous
and orthogonal to the explanatory variables we used.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we revisit the issue of wage and employment adjustments
at individual ￿rms in Japan. We use the results of a survey on this
very topic that we conducted from a sample of Japanese ￿rms. Our
data from the survey covers recent episodes of distress and we use their
reported incidences of employment and wage adjustments to investigate
the determinants on the magnitudes of these adjustments.
Prior to the long stagnation of the Japanese economy, wage ￿ exibil-
ity was often singled out as the major factor responsible for the rapid
recovery from the two recessions after the major price hike of crude oil.
Although our data do not extend back to those early years, the major
￿ndings that emerge from the analysis points in a somewhat di⁄erent
23Aside from those reported in Tables 9 and 10, we also conducted alternative set
of regressions including two additional controls. One variable is the type of shock as
reported as the underlying cause of the distress. The other is the year in which the
distress occurred. Qualitative results as reported in the text remain una⁄ected by
introduction of these additional control variables. We also ran regressions in which
the impact of shocks was estimated separately by the type or the year of the shock,
but failed to ￿nd a signi￿cant break in terms of the estimated coe¢ cient of the shock
size variable (cost_reduction_planned). These additional results are available, upon
requests, from the authors.
18direction, or at least allows us to draw a di⁄erent implication. Our ￿nd-
ings indicate that ￿rms adopt the base wage cut in distress if they are
insulated from the competitive pressure in the external labor market and
do not face strong competition in the product market. Our speculation
is that their wages include some premium or rents and the presence of
such a "slack" facilitates the downward adjustment in the base wage.24
On the other hand, our analysis is not conclusive enough even to
speculate if there is any change in the speed of the employment ad-
justment. We also failed to detect quantitatively signi￿cant interactions
between the wage and employment adjustments. Our regression analy-
sis only con￿rms the obvious: the severity of the shock necessitated the
downward adjustment of employment. For some ￿rms, the shocks were
simply too large to be absorbed by wage adjustments alone.
If we place these ￿ndings in the context of the slope of the Phillips
Curve, it seems that the apparent ￿ attening of the curve may well be
a simple but inevitable outcome of the disappearance of the wage pre-
mium, after the decade of stagnation that reduced or even washed away
the extra pro￿ts that some Japanese ￿rms used to share with their em-
ployees. Firms paying only the market wage rate cannot possibly reduce
the wage rate without losing their employees. If so, the ￿ atter Phillips
curve may well be real and it is here to stay with us as long as the
stagnation of the economy continues.
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Table 2:    The year in which they experienced major distresses 
 
Year Cases % Cumulative %
Before 1995  30 1.05 5.5
1995 14 1.83 7.34
1996 9 1.18 8.52
1997 21 2.75 11.27
1998 50 6.55 17.82
1999 42 5.5 23.33
2000 56 7.34 30.67
2001 76 9.96 40.63
2002 109 14.29 54.91
2003 86 11.27 66.19
2004 51 6.68 72.87
2005 46 6.03 78.9
2006 54 7.08 85.98
2007 59 7.73 93.71










Share of employees  (%) Firm  characteristics 
Age<24  Tenure>15yrs. Employment  Mfg. (%) Sales pc.  Total sales
no 16.41  30.51 225  45.95 311.1  953.1 
yes 19.46  36.93 211  51.51 248.6  603.1 
total 17.32  32.45  221  47.61 292.7  864.7  
Table 3: The source of the negative shock 
 
Underlying shocks  Freq.  Percent
Decline of sales  627  75.2 
Rise of input Price  31  3.7 
Innovation 7  0.8 
Others 156  18.7 
n.a. 13  1.6 









No Yes  Total 
Base Wage 
Adjustments 
No 191 218  409 
Yes 143 211 354 
Total 334  429 763 
  
Table 5: Change of key variables during the three year period 
 
  Year -1  The Year  Year +1  2008 
Total sales (output) 108.3  100.0  97.9  111.5 
Average bonus per employee  118.6  100.0  97.8  116.8 
Hiring of new school graduates  94.8  100.0  71.3  94.1 





Table 6: Qualitative assessments on the impacts of base wage cuts: How important are each of these 
factors in preventing base wage cuts? 
 
 Average  Score# 
 Total  Incidence  Wage  cut 
Regulations / collective agreements  3.03 3.21(**)  3.22 
Damages worker morale  4.31 4.34  4.33 
Damages firm reputation, future recruitment made difficult  3.40 3.46(*)  3.40 
Induces quits of the most productive workers  3.72  3.74  3.69 
Induces quits, leading to higher training costs  2.97  3.05(*)  3.09 
Against implicit agreement for a fair wage  2.82  2.82  2.82 
Employees concern over relative wage  3.45  3.54(*)  3.57 
In parenthesis, **[*] indicates Pearson chi2 test indicates significant difference at 1 [5]% confidence level in response vis-à-vis total 
sample (for distress group), or distress group(those actually cut the base wage). # respondents are asked to pick 1: totally irrelevant, 









Table 7: Qualitative assessments on the impacts of layoffs: How important are each of these factors 
in preventing dismissals of regular, full time employees? 
 
 Average  Score# 
 Total  Incidence  Layoff 
Regulations / collective agreements  2.88 3.11(**) 3.17(*) 
Aggravates worker (union) relation and possible conflicts  3.28 3.41(**) 3.46(**) 
Damages worker morale  3.71 3.79(**) 3.79 
Damages job security and future prospect, inducing quits  3.64 3.71(**) 3.72 
Damages firm reputation, future recruitment made difficult  3.26 3.30  3.29 
Early retirement program invites quits of the most productive 
employees 
3.53 3.61(*)  3.62 
Loss of key staffs makes skill and know-how transfers to the 
younger employees difficult 
3.75 3.75  3.74 
# respondents are asked to pick 1: totally irrelevant, …2,3, 4,… to 5: highly important. The numbers shown are simple average.   
In parenthesis, **[*] indicates Pearson chi2 test indicates significant difference at 1 [5]% confidence level in response vis-à-vis total 
sample (for distress group), or distress group(those actually laid off its core employees)  
Table 8: Product market characteristics 
 
 Total  Incidence Wage  cut  Layoff   
Dominant form of competition: Price [or Quality]?  .59 .64(**) .66  .64 
Adopt Mark-up Pricing?  .44 .38(**) .37  .37 
Average score on the severity of price competition†  1.90 1.79(**) 1.74  1.80(**) 
How likely you follow to a 10% price cut by a rival firm? ‡  2.32 2.29  2.25(*) 2.29 
Average Frequency of price change: 6 months or shorter  .26 .29(**) .32  .29(**) 
†average scores corresponding to 1: fierce, 2,…5: almost none,   
‡average scores corresponding to 1: always follow,2,3…5: never follow 
In parenthesis, **[*] indicates Pearson chi2 test indicates significant difference at 1 [5]% confidence 
level in response vis-à-vis total sample (for distress group), or distress group(those actually laid off 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5a) (5b)
probit probit tobit tobit
S 0.066 0.049 1.076 0.739 0.071 0.059
(0.037)* (0.017)*** (0.290)*** (0.260)*** (0.038)* (0.018)***
-0.003 -0.000 -0.032 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001
(0.001)** (0.000)** (0.009)*** (0.005) (0.001)** (0.000)***
-0.005 -0.002 -0.043 -0.096 -0.005 -0.001
(0.002)** (0.003) (0.018)** (0.027)*** (0.002)** (0.003)
-0.001 0.002 -0.009 0.041 -0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.001)* (0.010) (0.017)** (0.002) (0.002)**
-0.001 0.001 -0.004 0.021 -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.013) (0.001) (0.001)
0.003 -0.000 0.018 0.032 0.003 0.000
(0.002)* (0.002) (0.013) (0.032) (0.002)* (0.002)






















P -0.032 -0.049 0.238 1.233 -0.010 -0.024
(0.218) (0.154) (1.428) (2.264) (0.218) (0.160)
-0.110 0.043 -2.616 1.590 -0.070 0.123
(0.191) (0.199) (1.390)* (2.741) (0.189) (0.210)
-0.353 0.097 -3.210 -0.131 -0.316 0.195
(0.160)** (0.184) (1.324)** (2.514) (0.161)** (0.187)
0.042 -0.176 -0.477 -2.252 0.051 -0.286
(0.142) (0.131) (0.979) (1.633) (0.144) (0.146)*
-0.274 0.192 -2.270 0.759 -0.244 0.282
(0.143)* (0.144) (1.034)** (1.700) (0.143)* (0.155)*
0.008 -0.013 0.063 -0.156 0.008 -0.017
(0.006) (0.005)** (0.034)* (0.070)** (0.006) (0.006)***
L -0.145 -0.022 -0.902 -0.201 -0.126 -0.012
(0.086)* (0.040) (0.495)* (0.568) (0.085) (0.038)
0.004 -0.003 0.049 -0.050 0.004 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.040) (0.075) (0.005) (0.005)
0.002 0.002 0.031 0.036 0.003 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.028) (0.048) (0.004) (0.005)
-0.015 -0.003 -0.060 0.260 -0.017 -0.005
(0.057) (0.053) (0.408) (0.646) (0.057) (0.057)
0.003 -0.002 0.009 0.009 0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.016) (0.031) (0.002) (0.003)
-0.359 0.932 -4.096 23.846 -0.337 1.536
(0.694) (0.786) (4.972) (10.900)** (0.673) (0.913)*
2.293 -0.992 13.515 -10.397 2.077 -1.146
(0.909)** (0.690) (6.466)** (8.378) (0.886)** (0.750)
Observations 317 330 317 330
Wald chi2 93.44 70.05
8.241 15.667
(0.446)*** (1.619)***
F value 3.23 9.17
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
















degree of price competition
behavior for price reduction
demandcurve
obstacle for base wage
reduction (reputation)
cost of employment reduction
(2)
cost of employment reduction
(3)







cost of base wage reduction
(1)
cost of base wage reduction
(2)
cost of base wage reduction
(3)
cost of base wage reduction
(4)
obstacle for base wage
reduction (adverse selection)
bivatiate probit
planned amount of cost
reduction (%)




new graduate hiring change
(%)















adjustment(6a) (6b) (7a) (7b) (8a) (8b) (9a) (9b)
instrumented variable
0.578 0.034 -0.427 -0.010
(0.406) (0.031) (1.557) (0.035)
0.017 0.031 0.047 0.061 0.056
(0.060) (0.062) (0.054) (0.045) (0.068)
-0.907 -0.086 -0.118 -0.076 -0.194 -0.015 -0.031 0.034
(0.688) (0.238) (0.085) (0.238) (0.671) (0.326) (0.036) (0.332)
-3.107 1.442 -0.329 0.666
(1.904) (1.466) (0.169)* (1.475)
-1.015 -0.660 -0.141 -0.707
(0.892) (0.640) (0.100) (0.624)
-0.029 0.023 -0.001 0.022
(0.040) (0.034) (0.003) (0.034)
0.181 -1.062 0.046 -0.765
(1.042) (0.732) (0.091) (0.728)
-1.389 0.163 -0.106 0.051
(0.684)** (0.618) (0.073) (0.624)
0.313 -0.365 -0.011 -0.365
(0.900) (0.799) (0.080) (0.784)
-2.625 -3.873 -0.101 -4.095
(7.758) (1.658)** (0.245) (1.614)**
2.709 -1.372 0.180 -1.338
(3.950) (2.658) (0.224) (2.708)
1.036 -3.654 0.103 -3.965
(6.681) (1.431)** (0.252) (1.414)***
-0.273 1.039 -0.050 1.184
(1.737) (1.273) (0.091) (1.148)
-0.673 -0.292 0.042 -0.350
(1.395) (0.715) (0.082) (0.737)
0.050 -0.004 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.035 0.000 0.033
(0.046) (0.038) (0.004) (0.037) (0.062) (0.043) (0.004) (0.042)
0.029 0.019 0.002 0.013 0.034 0.023 0.001 0.027
(0.041) (0.043) (0.004) (0.043) (0.069) (0.044) (0.004) (0.040)
0.093 -0.515 -0.013 -0.424 -0.319 -0.511 -0.022 -0.483
(0.452) (0.441) (0.048) (0.442) (1.095) (0.395) (0.049) (0.401)
0.003 0.000 0.002 -0.003 0.033 0.011 -0.001 0.007
(0.023) (0.024) (0.002) (0.023) (0.049) (0.024) (0.002) (0.024)
-7.285 9.054 -0.299 8.568 28.706 4.727 1.066 4.728
(7.854) (7.513) (0.754) (7.412) (14.407)** (5.992) (0.775) (6.160)
1.599 1.393 2.112 3.417
(1.730) (1.999) (3.516) (2.006)*
-1.727 -1.277 -2.257 -2.679
(1.089) (1.178) (2.231) (1.678)
-1.011 -0.962 -0.334 -0.771
(1.439) (1.600) (1.563) (1.803)
-1.042 -0.692 -0.570 -1.392
(0.902) (1.045) (1.857) (1.115)
-1.675 -1.158 -0.375 -0.769
(0.969)* (0.995) (0.823) (1.162)
-0.064 -0.066 0.001 -0.041
(0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.054) (0.026)
0.004 0.005 -0.016 -0.011
(0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.013)
-0.009 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
0.023 0.022 -0.034 -0.029
(0.014) (0.014) (0.032) (0.034)
Constant 2.085 22.937 0.871 21.451 5.254 14.078 0.102 15.644
(9.082) (5.086)*** (1.107) (4.846)*** (23.185) (5.017)*** (0.616) (5.264)***
Observations
alpha . -0.671 . -0.734 . 1.099 . 0.371
(0.398)* (0.425)* (1.623) (0.458)
317 330 334
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Other explanatory variables: industry dummies and employment
size dummies.
behavior for price reduction
sales change (%)
bonus change (%)








degree of price competition






ratio of long tenured worker
wage per capita
cost of base wage reduction (3)
cost of base wage reduction (4)
obstacle for base wage reduction
(adverse selection)
obstacle for base wage reduction
(reputation)
cost of employment reduction (2)
cost of employment reduction (3)
(first stage independent
variable)




cost of base wage reduction (1)
cost of base wage reduction (2)
























adjustmentsales per capita annual total sales per employee
separate rate ratio of number of separated workers and total stock of workers
degree of ageing ratio of workers whose age is 55 year old and over
ratio of long tenured worker ratio of workers whose tenure is 15 year and over
wage per capita annual total wage bill per employee
behavior for price reduction
When the competitors reduce their price, what do you do?; 1:Always
reduce my own price to 4: Always stay on
demandcurve
If the price of your main products rises 10%, what percentage of sales do
you lose?
margin diviation from industry average of (total amount of wage cost) / (sales cost)
no autonomous dummy dummy for no autonomous about pricing (Base is mark up pricing)
follower dummy dummy for following the price of competitors (Base is mark up pricing)
degree of price competition degree of price competition; 1:severe to 4: never
obstacle for employment reduction (adverse selection)
Layoff induces quits of the most productive workers; 1: totally irrelevant to
5: highly important
obstacle for employment reduction (reputation)
Layoff damages firm reputation, future recruitment made difficult; 1:
totally irrelevant to 5: highly important
quality competition dummy for quality competition (Base is price competition)
cost of employment reduction (2)
the time period to recover usual productivity when 10% employment is
layoffed is more than 30 days and less than 60 days.
cost of employment reduction (3)
the time period to recover usual productivity when 10% employment is
layoffed is more than 60 days and less than 90 days.
cost of employment reduction (4)
the time period to recover usual productivity when 10% employment is
layoffed is 90 days and more.
cost of base wage reduction (4)
effect of quality of mid career hiring after 10% base wage cut; 1:no effect
to 4: severe
obstacle for base wage reduction (adverse selection)
Base wage cut induces quits of the most productive workers; 1: totally
irrelevant to 5: highly important
obstacle for base wage reduction (reputation)
Base wage cut damages firm reputation, future recruitment made difficult;
1: totally irrelevant to 5: highly important
cost of base wage reduction (1)
number of meeting with individualworker needed to negotiate 10% base
wage cut individually
cost of base wage reduction (2) incease percentage of quit if base wage is cut by 10% collectively
cost of base wage reduction (3)
expected increase in time length to fill vacant position after 10% base wage
cut
bonus change (%) % change of average bonus pior to adjustment
new graduate hiring change (%) % change of number of newly graduates hiring pior to adjustment
overtime change (%) % change of average overtime pior to adjustment
Appendix: Variable Definition
planned amount of cost reduction (%) planned amount of cost reduction (%)
squared planned amount of cost reduction squared planned amount of cost reduction
sales change (%) % of sales change pior to adjustment